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Introduction 
This paper reviews recent literature and evidence related to the topics of violent jihad 
and the lesser known cultural jihad and argues that the West would benefit from a lens that 
combines the two threats rather than parsing them out as distinct problems. The authors 
attempt to increase understanding related to (1) how the concept of jihad has transitioned 
toward the commonly held strict interpretation of a holy war in the name of Islam and (2) 
what themes apply to the types of jihad that are being waged against the West. 
This research also identifies several shared operational themes present in both violent 
jihad and cultural jihad and found that the Western intelligence community is uniquely 
qualified to provide a foundation for the West’s response to these shared tactics between 
violent jihad and cultural jihad. As a result, the Western homeland security apparatus and, 
particularly, the intelligence community might benefit from an overall approach to a 
combined threat from violent and cultural jihad. The paper also emphasizes the need for 
academic research that adds cultural jihad into the body of work. 
Although many are aware of the threat of violent jihad, a lesser-known threat is that 
of cultural jihad (Yousef, 2019). The combined threat of violent and cultural jihad creates 
some unique challenges, but also produces some shared themes that might serve as focal 
points for the intelligence community’s attempts to combat the threats. Overall, this paper 
addresses the problems of violent and cultural jihadism and aims to add to the limited body of 
academic work relative to the combined threat from the two. 
 
Violent Jihad 
Historically, jihad was defined as a struggle (Emerick, 2000). External jihad consists 
of actions in furtherance of Islam, against an external person or entity (Emerick, 2000). In 
contemporary society, Jihad has become commonly known by many as holy war and 
  
violence in the name of Islam (Clifton, 2017). Taylor and Swanson (2019) attributed the 
initial shift of jihad toward a ‘holy war’ interpretation as a result of the approach of 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the Wahhabi movement during the 1700s. They argued 
that the Wahhabi labeled any group in opposition to the Wahhabi movement as non-Muslim, 
and potentially deserving of jihad against them in the form of a holy war. Readers might note 
the beginning of two themes that will be re-visited in the coming sections. One theme reflects 
a shift toward a willingness to identify any non-fundamentalist Muslim as a ‘non-Muslim.’ 
Another theme reflects the trend toward extreme violence in the name of the fundamentalist 
specific interpretation of Islam. 
Historical underpinnings 
Modern Islamism has been primarily dominated by groups that align with the ideals 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, stemming back to its inception in the 1920s (Haykel, 2016; 
Wickham, 2015). Essentially, the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood were to overthrow any 
secular government where the Muslim Brotherhood operates and institute Sharia law in the 
country (Haykel, 2016; Wickham, 2015). The Muslim Brotherhood was influenced by the 
Saudi Arabian Wahhabi strict interpretation of Islam and began in Egypt partially in response 
to British colonialism and other injustices in Cairo, Egypt (Commins, 2006; Obaid, 2017). 
The political and social justice orientation at that time resulted in the formation of a political 
ideology combined with Islam, which became known as ‘Islamism’ (Calvert, 2010). 
Proponents of Islamism found themselves discussing the ‘Islamic state’ likely for the first 
time in recent history (Calvert, 2010), similar to how a political figure would refer to a 
socialist state or a democratic state. This shift was key to the evolution of jihad toward its 
current form. Political ideology, perceived social injustice, and all the tumultuousness of 
social change and unrest began affecting people who practiced a religion that espoused an 
  
increased acceptance of violence reflected within Islam’s key holy book, prophetic role 
model, and its roots in struggle. 
Key radical Islamic figures and events 
Commins (2006) described Sayyid Qutb as an Egyptian Islamic author, educator, and 
poet who led the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s and who would 
become a key figure in the evolution of jihad. During his career as an educational official, 
Qutb was sent to the U.S. for schooling in order to study some of the educational methods 
used in America (Calvert, 2010). Qutb’s two years in the U.S. solidified his dislike for 
America because he witnessed American materialism, propensity toward violence, 
individualism, sexuality, and overall emphasis on outward appearances (Taylor & Swanson, 
2019). The aforementioned characteristics were contrary to his values as a Muslim. Qutb 
returned from America convinced that Western influence was corrupting Egypt and the 
greater Islamic world. Qutb’s transition was an important milestone in the development of 
modern violent jihad when he re-ignited the idea that, despite a person professing to be 
Muslim and worshipping Islam, that person could truly be non-Muslim by virtue of his or her 
actions. This was known as ‘takfir’ (Stanley, 2005). This labeling would be an important 
form of reasoning to allow later radical Islamists to avoid moral injury even while 
committing violence against other Muslims. Qutb’s experience in prison and mistreatment by 
other Muslims galvanized his previous thoughts that he could essentially issue a takfir and 
disqualify someone from being a Muslim as a result of the person’s actions, and that no 
compromise could be reached with secular governments, as they were inherently 
contradictory to Islam. 
Qutb was later arrested for his role in the Muslim Brotherhood, detained, tortured, and 
interrogated (Obaid, 2017). He called for Islamist revolution against the Egyptian 
government in his book Signposts on the Road (Calvert, 2010). Qutb’s legacy was also 
  
reflected in his eventual influence over Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who would prove to be 
another central figure in the development of Islamism and the eventual direction of jihad. Al-
Zawahiri would eventually ascend to prominence within radical Islam, become second in 
command of al-Qaeda behind Osama Bin Laden, and play a key role in the 9/11 attacks 
(Taylor & Swanson, 2019). As a youth, Al-Zawahiri’s family was friends with Qutb, and Al-
Zawahiri had read Qutb’s books. When Qutb was eventually executed by the Egyptian 
government, he was viewed as a martyr. Qutb’s execution prompted or finalized Al-
Zawahiri’s transition toward militant Islamism. 
Al-Zawahiri had become heavily involved in plans to overthrow the secular Egyptian 
government, and he blamed Western influence and support of the Egyptian government 
(Wright, 2006). Al-Zawahiri was later involved in the planning of the murder of Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat. Sadat’s murder was among the first high-profile example in recent 
years of extremists justifying the murder of a fellow Muslim as a result of the writings of 
Qutb. Thus, one can see an example of Qutb’s concepts being operationalized by Al-
Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri was later imprisoned for his involvement in the murder of Egyptian 
President Sadat. Again, one can observe the recurring theme of the militant’s exposure to 
violence, torture, and execution as an emboldening step toward radical Islamism. The 
Wahhabi fundamentalist views of Saudi Arabia that shaped Qutb and Al-Zawahiri would also 
shape Osama Bin Laden. However, Bin Laden benefitted from what became known as the 
Islamic awakening, creating a call to arms toward his cause and increasing his popularity. 
Islamic awakening 
When three secular Arab governments were defeated in the Six-Day War against 
Israel, an ideological vacuum occurred in the Middle East (Susser, 2017). Islamists gained 
influence by convincing younger Muslims that Allah was punishing secular governments for 
veering away from religious involvement in government (Machairas, 2017). This loss and the 
  
subsequent argument from Islamists would prompt a paradigm shift and increased the 
popularity of the idea of an Islamic state. This shift was known as ‘Sahwa,’ or ‘the 
awakening’ (Commins, 2006). Shia Muslims were consolidated when the secular Shaw fell 
from power and an Islamic government was installed (Susser, 2017). Sunni Muslims would 
also experience increased unity when Russia invaded Afghanistan (Macharais, 2017). This 
was another example of Muslims radicalizing in response to violence against their own. 
When Muslims across the world observed suffering on the part of Afghan Muslims, many 
volunteered to travel to Afghanistan and fight in the Mujahedeen (Commins, 2006). 
Osama Bin Laden’s fundamentalist lens on Islam was likely shaped by his upbringing 
in Saudi Arabia, which is known for a strict interpretation of Sharia law (Terrill, 2016). 
Despite, or perhaps due to, his wealthy family’s Westernization, Bin Laden was known for 
his strict adherence to Islam from a young age (Ross, 2015). During college, Bin Laden was 
exposed to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, including Qutb’s brother, Mohammed Qutb, a 
popular lecturer who emphasized the fundamentalist perspective. Bin Laden’s Wahhabi 
foundation and Islamist personal influences would eventually shape the development of al-
Qaeda and modern violent jihad (Ross, 2015). When interviewed in 1998 by John Miller with 
ABC News (ABC News, 2006), Osama Bin Laden expressed his belief that terrorism against 
the West, including non-combatants, is the same as America’s use of a nuclear bomb against 
Japanese non-combatant casualties. Again, one can see militants’ justifying violence that is 
contrary to the teachings of the Quran. One can also see the use or justification of a 
heightened level of violence by radical Islamists in response to prior violent tactics by their 
foes. Certainly, the potential exists that Bin Laden was simply using his knowledge of history 
as an excuse to justify his course of action. However, his comment resonates as an indication 
of a lens similar to that reflected when Qutb saw the materialism of America, and when Qutb 
and later Al-Zawahiri were each subjected to torture. 
  
Bin-Laden and Zawahiri found themselves working together when Zawahiri joined 
the fight against the Russians in Afghanistan as members of the Taliban (Wright, 2006). This 
connection combined all the aforementioned direct and indirect influences experienced by 
both men and prompted the expansionist or offensively oriented approach that would come to 
be synonymous with modern violent jihad. Commins (2006) described Salafism as 
synonymous with Wahhabism. Taylor and Swanson (2019) described al-Qaeda as second-
generation Salafism or jihadist Salafism. The precursor to this was first-generation Salafism, 
which is also known as traditional Salafism (Taylor & Swanson, 2019). Islamic unity, anti-
imperialism, and anti-colonialism were the original tenants of Salafism. Leadership transition 
within Salafism would trigger intellectual and social reforms to Islamic thought. Attempts 
were made to reconcile Islamic modernist reform with Islamic elders. Salafist modern 
interpretation of the Quran also ran contrary to fundamentalist Wahhabism. Many of the 
Taliban fighters were radicalized during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan—and likely, 
subsequent U.S. military action in Afghanistan—and this radicalization would signal a shift 
toward second-generation or jihadist Salafism. 
The emergence of jihadist Salafists, including al-Qaeda, also marked the beginning of 
a new paradigm in which radical Islamists no longer view violence as the primary mechanism 
to achieve their goals. Instead, they began viewing violence as the only mechanism capable 
of achieving their goals. Jihadist Salafists also have a more global view of jihad against the 
West and, since their emergence in the 1980s, have become more offensive-minded in their 
global approach to jihad against the West (Haykel, 2016). Certainly, one could argue that the 
Jihadist Salafist approach is among the primary violent jihad-related threats to the West and 
America. Figure 1 depicts a pathway from a strict interpretation of Islam through 
fundamentalist Islamist ideology and key leadership, which has facilitated the modern 
approach toward global violent jihad. 
  
 
Figure 1. Pathways and factors in the development of modern violent jihad. 
Threats posed to the United States and the West 
Violent jihad now poses an existential threat to the West and the U.S. through jihadist 
Salafists (Taylor & Swanson, 2019). This threat is due in large part to their unflinchingly 
confrontational and offense-oriented approach toward overcoming what they view as un-
Islamic governments, and the support provided by the West. Certainly, the West, and 
particularly the U.S., also played a role in the radicalization with consistent troop 
deployments to the Middle East over the past 30 years. The U.S. even had a hand in 
emboldening the Taliban through CIA-led support operations during the fight against the 
spread of communism in Afghanistan. As described in the earlier paragraphs, radicalized 
Islamic fighters such as al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State of 
  
Iraq and Levant (ISIL) have evolved to pose a serious and continuous threat to the West and 
the U.S. 
According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) (START, 2019), the threat worldwide is primarily from radical Islamists 
who have committed a majority of terror attacks. Additionally, most if not all of those 
countries are often known for social unrest, such as Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. As of 2018, 
the U.S. did not even fall within the top 15 countries regarding the number of attacks from 
terrorism. Thus, one could be misled to believe that the primary terrorism threat in the U.S. is 
due to right-wing groups, and that violent jihad is a minor threat to the U.S. Truly, a majority 
of terrorist attacks in the U.S. are indeed from far-right domestic groups. However, the deaths 
resulting from these attacks are inconsistent. From 2000 to 2018, more than half of the far-
right domestic terrorism attacks in the U.S. resulted in no casualties (START, 2019). In 
addition, a few attacks produced high casualties, which essentially create a few outliers in the 
data. Thus, the data can be deceiving when attempting to generalize or make comparisons. 
Additionally, radical Islamists are actively and effectively expanding their reach (Christie, 
2018), and have proven more effective at consistently taking lives than the aforementioned 
far-right groups in the U.S. (START, 2019). Even a single casualty from terrorism is too 
many. However, policy-makers and homeland security leaders might consider whether the 
threat of far-right terrorism in the U.S. could be a form of ‘red herring’ when compared to the 
ever-expanding threat from radical Islamists who have proven to be consistently effective and 
who pose a direct and immediate threat from violent jihad. 
Islam is said to mean ‘submit’ or ‘surrender,’ and submission to Allah is among the 
primary messages of the Quran (Emerick, 2000). This can be interpreted as submission to 
Allah’s will, and those who have surrendered to Islam are in a form of peace (Emerick, 
2000). However, those who have not submitted to Islam may be considered to be in a state of 
  
war or perhaps turmoil. It follows that fundamentalist Islamists seeking violent jihad would 
consider themselves to be in a war-like state until non-Muslims submit or surrender to Islam. 
Further, radical Islamists would likely strictly interpret the need to wage jihad to make non-
Muslims “surrender,” in order to reach a state of peace. This strict interpretation seems 
particularly likely among fundamentalists, using the Quran’s references to war as 
justification. However, other Islamists are waging another kind of jihad in an attempt to shift 
Western culture using subterfuge instead of overt violence. 
 
Cultural Jihad 
 Yousef (2019) discussed the idea of a ‘third jihad,’ which is synonymous with 
cultural jihad. Aside from radical Islamists, he described a second type of fundamentalist 
Islamist as “political.” For the purposes of this paper, Yousef’s (2019) “political” Islamists 
will be referred to as cultural jihadists. Cultural jihadists are said to have the same goals as 
violent jihadists, but they use different mechanisms to work toward that goal. Like jihadist 
Salafists, cultural jihadists hope to eventually overtake Western culture and essentially 
establish a worldwide fundamentalist Islamic state. However, cultural jihadists operate within 
the existing Western legal and political systems to achieve those goals. They use the 
protections of the current legal structure, including the U.S. Constitution, in their attempt to 
install Sharia law. They are said to be using government technology, and public relations 
savvy to build influence to put radical Islamists into influential positions. 
 Some might argue that Yousef’s (2019) examples of cultural jihad may teeter on the 
edge of conspiracy theory. However, federal trial exhibits bolster his argument. The Holy 
Land Foundation (HLF) was a Muslim charity operating in the U.S. throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s. During 2009, several of the key figures in HLF were convicted of federal 
charges related to providing support for Hamas (USDOJ, 2009). Government Exhibit 003-
  
0085 3:04-CR-240-G from the case is titled An Explanatory Memorandum on the General 
Strategic Goal for the Group in North America: 5/22/1991 (Center for Security Policy, 2013). 
The exhibit describes civilization jihad as a type of grand jihad that destroys Western 
civilization from within through sabotage. Thus, the concept of cultural jihad has existed 
within radical Islamist communities since at least the 1990s. The use of asymmetrical tactics 
and extreme attention to planning and patience are all ways in which radical Islamists have 
proven successful in violent jihad (Taylor & Swanson, 2019), and those characteristics could 
also apply to cultural jihad. 
 Among the key figures in modern Islamism, Sayed Qutb was known for his multiple 
publications. Among those was Qutb’s (1977) publication, which indicated that the peace that 
Muslims should seek also translates to submission to Allah. Qutb (1977) argued that the 
intention of Islam was peace. However, further analysis of his writings provides indications 
that peace cannot happen until others submit to Allah. Thus, if one’s lens is radical or violent, 
any positive or peaceful ideals within Islam can easily be interpreted as the need for offensive 
action by Muslims. Qutb (1977) stated, “Those who claim the right to legislate for people and 
exclude God’s legislation are aggressors and are liable to divine punishment” (p. 72). Thus, 
any secular government is considered an ‘aggressor’ against Islam, and defense is justified. 
He also stated, “when dealing with its enemies Islam takes one of three courses: They may 
adopt the religion,or pay the tribute or fight” (p. 73). Using Qutb’s (1977) logic and 
arguments as a foundation, radicals would likely feel justified in resorting to cultural jihad as 
a supplement to violent jihad as one of the three options for “dealing with its enemies.” Thus, 
careful consideration of the possible threat of cultural jihad is warranted. 
Threats posed to the United States and the West 
 Cultural jihad is also a realistic tactic, particularly given jihadists’ history of extreme 
patience in their approach, as well as their display of unmatched imagination, 
  
resourcefulness, and willingness to use ‘the system’ against itself in their plots (Ilardi, 2009; 
Taylor & Swanson, 2019). Readers should also remember that violent jihadists have a history 
of probing potential targets for weaknesses, and methodically building relationships and 
history within a community or facility before attacking (Ilardi, 2009). In short, the 
operationalization of cultural jihad against the West would be a complicated, coordinated, 
and decades-long. Overall, an extremely lofty goal. However, so was defeating the Russian 
invasion of Afghanistan, and managing to essentially transform aircraft into weapons of mass 
destruction using only boxcutters (Taylor & Swanson, 2019). Indications of cultural jihad 
have been observed within the U.S. education system, houses of worship, and the 
government. 
Education. Moran (2019) reported events that some might consider a small step 
toward a decades-long cultural jihad and others might view as legitimate efforts to build 
understanding and tolerance. The event involved a California school responding to two 
Muslim students being bullied by distributing pro-Islam educational materials to increase 
tolerance of Muslim students. The education and tolerance initiative was orchestrated by the 
Council for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). A court settlement was reached, but the 
initiative had already been discontinued, replaced by a broader anti-bullying campaign. 
Liberals might describe this as yet another example of Islamophobia and conservatives might 
describe this as apparent favoritism toward one religion over others. However, even those 
casting cultural jihad aside as a conspiracy theory might take note of CAIR’s recent 
designation as a terrorist group by the United Arab Emirates during 2014 (Emirates News 
Agency, 2014). The Anti-Defamation League (2015) also reported that CAIR was associated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, two groups with designations or attempted 
designations as terrorist organizations. Even the biggest skeptics would likely question the 
legitimacy of an educational campaign with materials provided by a ‘designated terror group’ 
  
which has been tied to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Cultural jihadists hoping to build 
sympathy and inculcate a pro-Islamist attitude into the next generation of Americans would 
likely view the U.S. public education system as an attractive target. 
 Houses of worship. The Center for Religious Freedom (CRF) conducted research 
(2005) after The Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia (CDHR), a U.S.-
based non-profit, made public allegations of undue influence by the Saudi Arabian 
government over religion in the U.S. The CRF found that one of the recurring themes 
identified in this study, Wahhabi fundamentalism, was prominent within mosques in the U.S. 
at the time of the research. CRF also found that Wahhabi Saudi funding and support were 
consistent throughout the mosques and educational materials. CRF (2005) gathered more 
than 200 books and educational materials from more than 12 of the most prominent mosques 
in the largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. They found that all documents contained between 
one and five links to the Saudi Arabian government. Many of the publications included 
rulings known as fatwas that demonize Muslims who are tolerant of Christianity and non-
Muslims. These Saudi-funded Wahhabi schools were typically the only Islamic schools in the 
areas (9/11 Commission Report, 2002). 
Government influence. In addition, the aforementioned U.S. government exhibit lists 
the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), 
among others, as Muslim Brotherhood organizations or ‘friends’ (Center for Security Policy, 
2013). Authors such as Alto (2017) have reported on ISNA and its financial arm and NAIT as 
unindicted co-conspirators in the HLF federal case, and United States District Court (USDC) 
documents corroborate the unindicted co-conspirator status of ISNA and NAIT (USDC, 
2009). ISNA has met with former President of the United States Barrack Obama (ISNA, 
2013) and was described as a White House team member by the Obama administration 
(Obama, 2015). 
  
Other factors adding to the threat. The aforementioned examples of potential cultural 
jihad could be viewed as isolated incidents that could be interpreted as coincidence or as 
deliberately planned incursions. However, given the stated goal of a grand jihad that destroys 
Western civilization from within, the prior examples can just as easily be viewed as a 
reflection of the shrouded nature of the tactic. Certainly, given the placement of the 
previously mentioned events and entities, the threat of cultural jihad is a distinct possibility, 
worthy of attention and further research. The genius of cultural jihad and likely the most 
substantial challenge to defending against it is that cultural jihad manifests one small societal 
shift at a time with no measurable milestones. Additionally, cultural jihad does not provide 
any distinct galvanizing events that solidify people. Such incremental, measured, and 
distributed efforts toward a paradigm shift occur over decades, not months. The challenge 
rests in determining where one draws a line between suspicion of an entire group of people 
and monitoring a potentially real, long-term threat against the West and the U.S. Regardless 
of where the line is drawn, detection of such subtle and incremental manipulation of the lens 
of an entire generation would prove difficult even in the most security-oriented environment. 
One could even argue that cultural jihadism is passive in nature due to the glacial pace of its 
efforts. 
Another challenge in combatting cultural jihad is that it is meant not to change 
existing opinions of Islam but to build later generations’ opinions of Islam through systemic 
embedding within existing social support, government, and education structures. One can 
imagine the myriad challenges associated with educating a generation of Americans who are 
not only ignorant of the difference between Islam and radical Islam (Islamism) but also who 
only have the lens provided by radical Islamists in social education programs. Cultural jihad 
is also a proactive way of advancing a jihad or accessing key Western infrastructure, 
particularly for radical Muslims who are not suited for violence or have other useful skills. 
  
Thus, cultural jihad as a mechanism allows radical Islamists to leverage more of their 
resources toward a battle on multiple fronts. 
Overall, this literature review revealed a significant amount of academic research 
related to violent jihad, Islamism, and terrorism overall. However, a dearth of peer-reviewed 
research appears to exist related to cultural jihad. Much of the available information is from 
sources that, although often well-educated and reputable, may be considered by some to be 
politically or ideologically biased. Thus, a finding of this literature review is that researchers 
should prioritize a focus upon analysis of cultural jihad if only to identify what is known 
from peer-reviewed academic sources. 
 
Themes Identified Relative to Violent Jihad and Cultural Jihad 
Technology and social media 
 Technology is a useful tool to facilitate both violent jihad and cultural jihad. Indeed, 
German and Dutch authorities have expressed concern over what Banerjee (2014) described 
as ‘web jihad.’ Bangladeshi terrorists have communicated using Skype, and social networks 
such as Twitter and Skype were also used when more than 4,000 people were mobilized into 
violence between a Salafist group and another group in Germany. Particularly concerning is 
the trend that globally oriented violent jihadists are using online communications platforms 
operationally as command and control networks (Banerjee, 2014). ISIS and ISIL were 
identified as the first terrorist group to grow up with the Internet, and they are leveraging that 
access and knowledge to extend the reach of the jihadi threat worldwide, with a particular 
focus on the West. Klausen (2014) also found that social media plays a vital role in the 
operational strategy of jihadists. Twitter has been identified as a tool for communication, 
particularly in Syria and Iraq. 
  
 Technology and social media are likely important in cultural jihad as well. Few 
organizations operate without using a website and social media presence. These examples of 
potential cultural jihad all likely had websites and social media presence at some point. If one 
believes that cultural jihad is a real threat, it follows that cultural jihadists would use 
technology and social media in the same manner as their violent jihadist counterparts. 
Social engineering and romanticism 
 Christie (2018) emphasized radical Islamism’s seemingly ever-increasing reach, 
which is resulting in the radicalization of increasing numbers of young people. Haykel (2016) 
found that both ISIS and al-Qaeda marketed a romantic vision of renewed glory for Islam. 
Pisoiu (2015) discussed growing concern in the European intelligence community that 
residents who travel to the Middle East to fight in holy wars will return. Specifically, the 
concerns relate to a form of social engineering or recruitment where fighters return with 
stories of heroes returning from a righteous fight. Tales of adventure and honor would likely 
be attractive to other disenfranchised youths. This trend is concerning in its effectiveness at 
winning over impressionable young people toward radical Islam, taking a step toward 
cultural jihad. The trend is also troubling in that it facilitates radicalization and recruitment of 
additional fighters in violent jihad who represent an immediate threat in their home country 
and in the Middle East. 
 The proliferation of communication technology has aided in social engineering efforts 
that are now significantly less dependent upon geographic access to potential recruits in both 
cultural jihad and violent jihad. These romantic ideas and imagery are also effectively 
delivered using relatively low-tech and inexpensive technology. Internet videos depict 
emotional images and appeal to viewers’s loyalty by asking for financial support or direct 
involvement in combat (Banerjee, 2014). Shaw and Bandara (2018) analyzed the marketing 
techniques that helped Islamic State (IS) surpass al-Qaeda relative to global violent jihad. 
  
The researchers found that IS gained success by appropriating and extending key themes and 
communicating those themes using social media. Such social media messaging and 
recruitment is often aimed at disaffected youth (Mousseau, 2011). 
Demonization of the West and non-fundamentalist Muslims 
 Clifton (2017) analyzed the personal justifications of a self-identified Islamic violent 
jihadist. The jihadist articulated an ‘us versus them’ mentality and a belief in an ummah, or 
borderless Islamic community. Western democracy and culture were viewed as the enemy, 
and the threat of Western culture overtaking Islam serves as justification for violence against 
Muslims and non-Muslims in the name of Islam. Haykel (2016) also found that both al-
Qaeda and ISIS espoused violence as the only option and indeed a duty of Muslims. He also 
determined that both groups appealed to disenfranchisement and resentment of Muslims, 
particularly against the West. These themes would likely resonate with the cultural jihadist, 
since the ultimate goal is to collapse Western culture from within, thus leaving only the 
Islamic community. Christie (2018) found similar themes in radical recruitment efforts. It is 
unlikely these themes are limited to violent jihad, just as it is reasonable to apply them to 
cultural jihad. 
Globally oriented and offensive-minded 
 Haykel (2016) described prominent violent jihadists as global in their ambitions and 
their reach. START (2019) also reported some concerning trends relative to some of the most 
prominent violent jihadists: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. A discernible increase in ‘reach’ is 
occurring among these groups. The number of countries that experienced terrorist attacks by 
al-Qaeda and Islamic State-related groups has steadily increased since approximately 2003. 
Each group has committed terrorism in more than 50 countries (START, 2019). Cultural 
jihad appears to also be an offensive maneuver, and by nature, is globally oriented. The 
examples of cultural jihad at U.S. houses of worship, in education, and in the government,—
  
along with simply the definition of cultural jihad—would seem to qualify it as an offensive, 
and globally oriented tactic. 
 
 
Figure 2. Themes present in cultural jihad and violent jihad. 
  
  
Addressing the Combined Threat of Cultural Jihad and Violent Jihad 
 One might argue that the interaction between the U.S. and radical jihadists is a form 
of mutually assured destruction. Violence begets violence, and violent attacks will likely only 
strengthen the West’s resolve, and result in another generation of Americans volunteering for 
the military in response to an attack. However, the same could be said of violent jihadists. 
This is similar to the trends witnessed when Russia invaded Afghanistan and the U.S. 
invaded Iraq (Susser, 2017). Young Afghan and Iraqi men found themselves drawn toward 
Mujahedeen because an apparent foreign threat was present in their homeland. Although that 
repeated cycle of violence would likely be palatable to radical Islamists, to truly change the 
culture of the West, cultural jihad is arguably the more sustainable and effective long-term 
approach to overcome Western culture. 
Homeland security 
 One could argue that the West should continue to focus on limiting the potential for 
two-way communication between potential radicals and Islamist extremist organizations. By 
doing so, the West both limits the coordination between actor and director as well as 
potentially increasing the time necessary to plan, resource, and carry out such activities. 
Reducing the lanes of communication enhances the ability to identify, track, and intercept 
such actions and individuals by forcing them to seek alternate means of carrying out their 
activities. Thus, their method of attack is limited in its coordination and imagination. This 
disconnect would place operatives on a proverbial island with limited ability. This is 
particularly relevant given the importance of communication and coordination associated 
with sophisticated terrorist attacks (Miller, 2016). Few tasks are more complicated than the 
long-term manipulation of the social fabric and lens of a country. Other initiatives might be 
aimed at identifying key junctures between cultural jihad and violent jihad, particularly 
related to recruiting and radicalization efforts. 
  
Academia 
 Another way to combat the combined threat of violent jihad and cultural jihad is 
through peer-reviewed academic research, particularly on cultural jihad. Such academic 
research would provide a body of work to provide a knowledge base relative to cultural jihad. 
Higher education programs would then eventually incorporate the concept more readily into 
their curricula. This would expose a generation of intelligence and security students to the 
unpublicized threat of cultural jihad. Beyond academia, the active intelligence community 
would also likely play a primary role in the efforts above aimed at the nexus points between 
cultural jihad and violent jihad. 
 
The Role of the Intelligence Community 
The nature of intelligence 
 Taylor and Swanson (2019) defined ‘intelligence’ as an informational product or 
process that is generated from the analysis of data. They also defined counterintelligence as 
activities designed to stifle attempts to gather intelligence related to an organization or entity. 
Synthesis and analysis are the differences between ‘intelligence’ and ‘information.’ Human 
intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), 
technical intelligence (TECHINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), photographic intelligence 
(PHOINT), and open-source intelligence (OSINT) are a few of the types of intelligence. 
The international intelligence community works together and coordinates with law 
enforcement to fight terrorism (Taylor & Swanson, 2019). One major impediment to 
successful intelligence is the diffuse nature of the threat and the laws governing the use of 
specific intelligence organizations to gather data from and on individuals and entities. 
Another challenge to that coordination is that intelligence entities often want to collect 
information continually, and they have a high threshold for overtly acting on the intelligence 
  
generated, particularly when doing so would render the collection mechanism or source no 
longer useful. Law enforcement agencies are often drawn to ‘taking people off the streets.’ 
Both approaches have some use, but those differing approaches may also limit information 
sharing between agencies. This became evident after the 9/11 attacks. 
The U.S. Gilmore Commission (2003), which was initiated after 9/11, identified 
several areas for improvement. First, overreliance upon TECHINT instead of HUMINT. 
Next, law enforcement failed to receive important intelligence. Additionally, decentralization 
and bureaucracy created information silos. This was particularly prevalent in the FBI. Old 
computer systems lack interoperability between agencies also stifled information sharing 
attempts between law enforcement agencies. Finally, the commission determined that 
exceedingly restrictive laws and policies were limiting the effective use of human sources 
related to terrorist intelligence gathering. 
The role of the intelligence community in the engagement of jihad 
 With the exception of the CIA’s relatively limited clandestine activities oversees, U.S. 
intelligence agencies are not typically involved in the tactical or ‘ground level’ enforcement 
operations undertaken to fight terrorism in the U.S. Intelligence as a process and as a product 
are the crucial first step in identifying and preventing attacks (Hughbank & Githens, 2010). 
Typically, the intelligence provided by the intelligence community is used by the military or 
law enforcement during tactical movements or operations. Some law enforcement agencies, 
such as the FBI and Air Force Office of Special Investigations, fulfill significant intelligence 
missions along with their traditional law enforcement roles. Western popular culture assigns a 
hierarchy to such agencies with the CIA and FBI often taking the top seats. However, the 
reality is that resource limitations and the need for specialties within intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies necessitate the establishment of task forces made up of several 
agencies as the only way to investigate terrorism effectively. The FBI Joint Terrorism Task 
  
Force is one example of such a task force. In theory, the FBI’s role as an intelligence agency 
and a law enforcement agency would facilitate information sharing between intelligence and 
law enforcement, particularly on an FBI led task force. However, the reality is that law 
enforcement personnel sometimes do not have access to information gleaned from 
intelligence sources because federal laws sometimes restrict the sharing of information. 
Intelligence and violent jihad 
 The intelligence community will continue to support the law enforcement community 
and the military by collecting, prioritizing, and disseminating intelligence for use by law 
enforcement and military personnel (Hughbank & Githens, 2010). The intelligence 
community can provide valuable intelligence toward defensive anti-terrorism efforts, 
including law enforcement activities that are intended to intercept violent jihadists. The 
intelligence community also offers valuable intelligence to inform offensive counter-
terrorism operations by military personnel overseas. Strategic intelligence is used to support 
long-term planning efforts and allows law enforcement to understand some of the capabilities 
and threats associated with violent jihadists in their communities (Hughbank & Githens, 
2010). Strategic intelligence can be used toward a similar goal for offensive-oriented counter-
terrorism efforts by deployed military personnel. One might also note that both law 
enforcement and military personnel can play a key role in the collection of tactical 
intelligence during the intelligence collection cycle aimed at combatting violent jihad. 
However, despite the importance of intelligence agencies in combatting violent jihad, 
intelligence agencies might be even more uniquely situated to combat the cultural jihadist 
threat to the West, so long as the use of intelligence assets and capabilities remains true to the 
spirit of federal laws restricting the use of intelligence domestically. 
Intelligence and cultural jihad 
  
 Banerjee (2014) discussed the importance of counter-radicalization efforts against 
cultural jihad. Public education might be the most effective way to combat cultural jihad 
since ignorance of mainstream Islam versus radical Islamism allows for the latter perspective 
to flourish undetected within legitimate programs and agencies. However, similar to tactical 
counter-terrorism operations, counter-radicalization efforts begin with a quality intelligence 
product. Counter-radicalization will not be effective unless it is aimed at the appropriate 
groups, at the appropriate time, using the appropriate methods. Quality intelligence informs 
decision making. 
One might argue that cultural external jihad might be the larger long-term threat to the 
West. Certainly, the immediate threat of violence exhibited by violent jihadists is the most 
pressing threat, and tactical intelligence is an important part of the defense. However, the 
successful installation of fundamentalist Islamic ideals throughout the West and the U.S. has 
the potential to expand the existing overt threats into millions of ‘sleeper’ threats. As such, 
the intelligence community will play a large role in abating not only the current external 
violent jihadi threat but the undercurrent cultural jihadi threat to the West as well. Overall, 
the intelligence community is intended to support larger anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism 
efforts. As such, the intelligence community will be key to directly supporting law 
enforcement and military efforts toward anti-terrorism and counterterrorism. Given the 
themes identified in Figure 2, one might argue that the intelligence community should 
concentrate efforts on understanding and stifling the shared themes listed above since they 
impact both the short term and the long-term radical agenda. Strategic intelligence might also 
prove to be most effective in combatting cultural jihad since long-term trends and activities 
are of heightened importance. 
  
  
Conclusion 
 Overall, the authors found that the overrepresentation of violence within radical 
Islamism begins with literal fundamentalist interpretations of the Quran. This paper also 
revealed a pathway and series of key influencers that have shifted violent jihad to be viewed 
by radicals as (1) the only option for change and (2) an offensive and globally-oriented tactic. 
The shift begins with a Wahhabi fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran’s more violent 
passages. Four key, charismatic Islamist leaders and educators have been exposed-to and 
were responsible for an ever-increasing escalation of violence on both sides of the conflict. 
Due in part to the factors above, the four key, charismatic figures have essentially structured 
the framework for the globally focused, offensive-oriented violent jihad currently faced by 
the West. Violent jihad is now the primary immediate threat to the West.  
The authors also found that cultural jihad may be an equally dangerous long-term 
threat to the West. Additionally, violent jihad and cultural jihad each have some unique 
operational aspects, but many operational themes are shared. As a result, the U.S. homeland 
security apparatus and Western intelligence community might benefit from continued focus 
on the themes found in both types of jihad, while building an outline that maps not only the 
immediate threats from violent jihad but the long term and completely legal threats to the 
identity of Western culture through cultural jihad. 
 This research identified several shared operational themes present in both violent 
jihad and cultural jihad and found that the intelligence community is uniquely qualified to 
provide a foundation for the West’s response to these shared tactics between violent jihad and 
cultural jihad. The paper also suggests a more long-term approach to combatting cultural 
jihad through peer-reviewed academic research on cultural jihad, to expose future generations 
of intelligence students and security students to the threat of cultural jihad, and to add to the 
existing academic body of work on violent jihad. 
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